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It is interesting to examine fact-finding practices in culturally
distant societies. These practices often seem thoroughly permeated
by unreason, or else seriously defective in terms of the demands of
rational inquiry. But if we look at them more carefully, placing
them in their native cultural milieu, it usually emerges that they are
not nearly as unreasonable as superficial inspection suggests. Our
readiness to see them as tainted by unreason and radically different
from our own, springs in large part from the failure to appreciate
the degree to which the rationality of proof is culturally deter-
mined.' But as soon as the broad cultural perspective is introduced
we also begin to wonder whether our own evidentiary arrange-
ments are as free from admixtures of unreason as their theoretical
sublimation suggests. The study of exotic forms of proof provides
us with yet another benefit: it opens up vistas from which subtle
differences among contemporary Western proof systems come into
view that are otherwise barely noticeable. By studying culturally
distant fact-finding practices and locating ourselves among differ-
ent cultures, we come to understand somewhat better our own fact-
finding arrangements.
1. Confounding Fact and Law
Our rationalist Western tradition requires that the distinction
be maintained between fact and law. Evidentiary activity is di-
rected toward establishing the truth of factual propositions, while
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I A debate rages among anthropologists on what to make of cultural practices that
seem to us odd and illogical. Some consider these practices thoroughly discontinuous with
modem rationality - different cultures, different rationalities. See, e.g., MARSHALL SAH-
LINS, HISTORICAL METAPHORS AND MYTHICAL REALITIES (1981). Others argue that the
capacity to confront particular tasks with simple practicality and ordinary common sense
constitutes a pan-human characteristic - a cultural universal. See, e.g., GANANATH
OBEYESEKERE, THE WORK OF CULTURE: SYMBOLIC TRANSFORMATION IN PSYCHOANALY-
STS AND ANTHROPOLOGY (1990). I do not presume to know enough to take a position in
this larger controversy. But in my narrow field, the administration of justice, the disconti-
nuities among legal cultures seem not to be so sharp as to warrant the conclusion that
people are totally imprisoned by their way of being in the world, unreflectively acting out
their cultural code.
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the legal dimension of adjudication concerns itself with the correct-
ness or validity of legal standards to be applied to the facts deter-
mined. If fact-finding and "law-finding" are conflated, the object
of proof becomes elusive, and the rationality of the fact-finding en-
treprise seems to be negatively affected.
These are relatively novel concerns, however. For long peri-
ods of European legal history, the objective of lawsuits was to
"right" loosely defined wrongs. This objective resulted in a mode
of adjudication that failed to differentiate between fact-finding and
"law-finding." In German lands, for example, the distinction be-
tween factual and legal questions evolved only in the sixteenth cen-
tury, pari passu with the "lawyerization" of the administration of
justice, and the introduction of regular instruments of appellate re-
view on the Roman-canon model.2 Up until that time, the most
widespread mode of proof - the oath - did not relate to the truth
of specific facts, but rather to the global "justice" of claims and
defenses. To characterize such amorphous lawsuits as involving the
determination of material facts with the view to applying legal
norms, or as relating an established norm to a found fact, is to pro-
ject our analytical apparatus into an environment where it was as
yet unknown. Nor did these pre-modem European adjudicators
such as Moli~re's Monsieur Jourdain, fail to realize what they were
doing; their judgments actually flowed from "gestaltist" assess-
ments of what is proper or fitting in a concrete social situation.
Was this mode of adjudication tainted by unreason?
The question cannot properly be answered in abstracto, with-
out considering the enveloping socio-cultural context - tightly in-
tegrated social structures, the concept of law as a sense of
propriety, the absence of a bureaucratic machinery of justice, and
the like. When all these factors are duly considered, the fusion of
factual and legal issues appears to have been a sensible and effi-
cient arrangement. As Joseph Strayer has pointed out in discussing
an early type of such amorphous proceedings, intruders were
promptly punished, violence discouraged, disputes resolved, and
2 See FRANZ WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT 185-88 (1967).
For the long-standing fusion of fact and law in English administration of justice, see, e.g.,
PAUL VINOGRADOFF, ViLLAiNAGE IN ENGLAND 337 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1892).
3 Outside of Western legal culture, the failure to discriminate fact and law is still found
in many places. See CLtFFPoD GEERTZ, LocAL KNOWLEDGE: FuRTHER ESSAYS IN INTER-
PRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 189, 205 (1983).
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"anyone could understand what was going on."4 Even the avatars
of rational decisionmaking, our social choice theorists, would sub-
scribe to this assessment: they envisage conditions in which the
search for diffuse justice can "maximize utilities."
Reflecting on the fusion of fact and law in ancient European
adjudication invites another look at our dispersion of the two.
Starting from the factual side of this divide, observe the great di-
versity in the character and the grain of knowability of facts we
establish in adjudication. Admittedly, we often establish "brute"
facts that belong to the external world. The search for such facts
(e.g. the chemical properties of a product) is easily severable from
value judgments and does not entail application of legal criteria.
But the separation of the empirical from the evaluative and the
juridical becomes more difficult when subjective "states of the
mind" must be ascertained, such as intent, absence of consent, and
the like. Whatever difficulties we confront in this regard are com-
pounded when fact-finding necessitates complex, inter-subjective
evaluations,5 or when the course of future events must be predicted
as increasingly happens in contemporary litigation. Establishing
the "factual preconditions" for the application of legal norms
shades in these situations easily into the search for the norm. Nor
should it be forgotten that legal norms themselves can sometimes
become an object of proof, as is the case with foreign law.6 But the
line between fact and law can also be uncertain from the legal side
of the distinction, especially when open-ended norms, such as those
on negligence or pornography, come into play.' The line is most
tenuous in technocratic decisionmaking in which consequentialist
calculations become critical aspects of legal analysis; as these calcu-
4 JOSEPH R. STRAYER, The Writ of Novel Disseisin in Normandy at the End of the
Thirteenth Century, in MEDIEVAL STATECRAFT AND THE PERSPECTrVES OF HISTORY 3, 7
(1971).
5 For example, if a person was confronted with a dangerous situation, did a situation
arise warranting the deployment of defensive measures?
6 We should thus not be overly surprised that following Aristotle, Cicero included stat-
utes (leges), precedents (res judicatae), and opinions of learned jurists among forensic
means of proof. See CICERO, 1 DE ORATo E 281,283 (E.W. Sutton trans., Harvard Univ.
Press 1967). In the court practice of the ancien regime, moreover, it was standard practice
for litigants to prove all legal norms other than those of Roman law.
7 Consider, for example, that the sexually explicit character of an object is not found
but rather "constructed" with an eye to the applicable standard of what constitutes pornog-
raphy. No wonder that lawyers reading the opinion of a court with power to pass on fac-
tual as well as legal questions often find it hard to establish whether the court has
announced a rule of law or resolved an issue of fact.
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lations proceed, fact-finding becomes truly inseparable from the
search for the law. All things considered, then, our separation of
fact and law, far from implicating the correlation of two different
realms of being, is more of a rationalist aspiration than a decision-
making reality.
It is tempting to suggest that the Anglo-American variant of
Western adjudicative systems comes closer to its "diffuse" ancestor
than the continental variant. The long-standing love affair of conti-
nental judiciary with textually fixed, abstract rules is well known.
The civil service judiciary puts a high premium on cross-case con-
sistency, even if it comes at some cost to finely tuned, individual-
ized justice. As a result, the factual foundation of the continental
decision - the matter that triggers the application of the legal
norm - tends to be quite distant from the "thickness" of real life,
closely edited, so to speak, to fit the artificial world of legal rele-
vancy. And, as a result, adjudication can be approximated with
some plausibility to an enterprise of joining an empirical situation
to a jural principle.
In the Anglo-American judicial apparatus, on the other hand,
the paradigmatic decisional standard is the precedent - a factually
rich professional anecdote from which abstract rules cannot easily
be distilled. Individualized justice is more highly valued than on
the Continent, and this orientation further complicates a sharp di-
viding line between the quest for the law and the search for the
facts. Most importantly, the role of the jury is not strictly limited to
the "what happened" aspect of litigation. In criminal cases, for ex-
ample, jury acquittals can be based on the impulse to pardon, or on
vague intuitions of what is just under the circumstances, despite
judicial admonitions to the contrary. In short, the foundation of
common law verdicts remains closer to social reality where fact and
value mesh.8 The rationalist model of adjudication does not "fit"
decisionmaking patterns as well as in the more differentiated and
bureaucratized machinery of justice on the Continent.
It could be argued on other grounds that European procedure
was threatened with "irrationality" well into the eighteenth cen-
tury. The object of proof, even ultimate facts, could include
fantasist matter. In witchcraft prosecutions, for example, fact-find-
8 There are other grounds, herein unexamined, for doubting whether the line between
law and fact is drawn the same way in Anglo-American and continental legal traditions.
See, eg., RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 647, (5th ed. 1988).
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ers were required to establish the existence of the contract with the
devil as a necessary element of the crimen magiae. Lawyers crafted
elaborate doctrines upon outward signs from which this contract
could be inferred.9 This rightly impresses us as "irrational." A ba-
sic prerequisite of rational fact-finding is that imaginary facts
should not be permitted to sneak into the object of proof. But can
we really be sure that "facts" we seek to establish are always free
from social illusions? Today's truths, tomorrow's superstitions.
Psycho-analytical findings we routinely employ in many types of
litigation, for example, might someday soon be accorded a
"fantasist" status.10
2. Appeals to divinity and to divine punishment
As already intimated, medieval lawsuits were mainly decided
by oath-swearing. Those who took the oath were not witnesses in
our sense - that is, individuals swearing to the truth of factual
propositions. Rather, they swore to their belief in the rectitude of
the cause advanced by the party who relied on them. These "oath-
helpers" (conjuratores or testes de credulitate) strike us as rationally
defective means of proof. But this characterization attaches with
even greater force to trials by ordeal that rested on the belief that
deity could be induced to intervene in adjudication and resolve the
question of right and wrong." Because of the employment of such
exotic "truth revealing" devices, the prevailing convention dis-
misses medieval administration of justice as irrational. Like
denizens of the Tristes Tropiques, medieval people seem to have
been thoroughly afflicted by primitive mentality. Sharp, perhaps
9 On these signs, including traces of sexual intercourse with the devil, see HEINRICH
INSTITORIS & JAMES SPRENGER, MALLEUS MALEFICARUM, pt. III, Question XV at 473-80
(Montague Summers trans., Arrow Books 1971) (1928). Note, parenthetically, that the
English translation of this fifteenth century prosecutorial handbook, published in New
York in 1971, follows the mistaken habit of referring to the first co-author as Heinrich
Kramer.
10 Leave to one side that the meaning of social "illusion" is complicated by the recogni-
tion that the life-world is socially constructed. See infra note 26.
11 It was believed, for example, that supernatural forces will assist an innocent litigant
to walk over red-hot ploughshares without sustaining injury (examen vomerum ignitorum).
While most ordeals were "unilateral," some involved both parties. Contrary to widespread
belief, however, judicial duel was not always regarded as a magical test inviting the inter-
vention of deity. See, e.g., ST. THoMAs AQUINAS, 3 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, seconda secon-
dae, ques. 95, art. 8, at 1600-02 (Fathers of the English Dominion Province trans., Christian
Classics 1981)(1911). See HEINRICH BRUNNER, 2 DEUTSCHE RECHTSGESCHICHTE
(1892)(the best source on Eurpean ordeals).
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incommensurable contrasts seem to exist between them and us;
they were incapable of reacting to adjudicative problems with sim-
ple practicality and ordinary common sense.
A somewhat different picture emerges, however, if we place
these devices in the context of early medieval life and consider
them as an integral part of the existing socio-judicial system. Most
disputes or misdeeds were then not subjected to a specialized jus-
tice machinery at all. Instead, as part of their everyday business,
kin-groups and local communities engaged in what we might call
"alternative dispute-resolution." In the course of this communal
action, much as in some present day tribal cultures, the need for
information was satisfied by communications from people who
knew something about the event that precipitated the community
to act. In other words, "natural" truth-revealing methods were em-
ployed, and so was the common sense as it existed in that historical
period. The grist for the judicial mill was only the residue of cases
whose importance transcended or whose resolution evaded the lo-
cal community. And in regard to this residue, oath-helpers and
magical tests should not be hastily dismissed as incapable of pro-
ducing outcomes we would consider as accurate today.
First, consider the oath-helpers. It is unlikely that they were
ready to accept divine punishment by falsely swearing to the justice
of a litigant's cause. After all, the belief in supernatural forces was
part of social reality in medieval communities. Persons willing to
take an oath to assist a litigant must have known him well, or pos-
sessed sufficient information to persuade themselves of the right-
ness of litigated issues. It is even possible that they conducted
personal inquiries prior to deciding whether to make themselves
available as conjuratores.'2 If we nevertheless persist in regarding
oath-helpers as an irrational mode of proof, we should also doubt
the rational character of English royal justice well into the six-
teenth century. Remember that original jury trials were not in-
structional; no evidence was taken in their course. The self-
informing Angevin jury would appear before the royal judge only
12 Nor should it be ruled out that at least some conjuratores were individuals capable of
perceiving "what is right" in a situation, rather than individuals informed about empirical
particulars of the case. If so, their role was close to that of witnesses in Muslim adjudica-
tion. For interesting remarks on "normative witnessing" in traditional Islamic administra-
tion of justice, see, e.g., GERTZ, supra note 3, at 190-91. I do not consider here a species
of "oath-helpers" who can easily be likened to our character witnesses; such procedural
participants do not strike us as strange truth-revealing devices.
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to answer his question of which side should win. The rationality of
the system hinges on whether jurors knew something about the
event sub judice because of their informal inquiries, or because
they witnessed the event in question.
Even in evaluating the character of trials by ordeal we must
tread more carefully, sensitive to the enveloping cultural milieu.
For starters, it should be recognized that magical tests were admin-
istered only when the required number of oath-helpers was miss-
ing, or the dispute could not be settled in any other way.13 Appeals
to the deity were hence contemplated as a means of last resort -
an act of desperation, as it were - when the nagging uncertainty
persisted about the right outcome of litigation. As we shall pres-
ently see, this is a situation in which even contemporary philoso-
phers disagree about what the rational course of action should be.
Consider, in addition, that the prospect of divine intervention must
have exerted a powerful psychological pressure on the litigant who
knew he was in the wrong. He must have felt impelled to desist
from pursuing a claim, or to confess. If we lose sight of this psy-
chological pressure, it is because we no longer believe in the ongo-
ing penetration of the world by sacred forces - a belief, however,
that constituted a living social reality to medieval men and women.
Even if the prospect of divine intervention did not cause the liti-
gants to make dispositive admissions, the preparations for the ad-
ministration of magical tests - solemn incantations in particular-
must have produced "demeanour evidence" (e.g., the agony in
those who felt guilty, or the serenity in those who felt innocent)
that is still widely used for fact-finding purposes. Demeanour and
body language may have influenced the calibration of the tests' se-
verity, or the manner in which their results were checked, thereby
opening up another avenue to litigational outcomes to which we
would still subscribe. 14 Contrary to initial impressions, then, magi-
cal forms of proof could produce correct results, so long as they
were supported by a world view that has not removed the sacred
from everyday life, or broken the continuity between social and
cosmic orders.
The predicament of medieval adjudicators asked to decide
with insufficient knowledge stirs uneasy shadows; it flashes up,
13 See ARTHUR ENOELMANN ET AL., A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
154-55 (Robert W. Millar ed. & trans., 1927).
14 See Rebecca V. Colman, Reason and Unreason in Early Medieval Law, 4 J. IN-
TERDisc. Hisr. 571, 589 (1974).
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again and again, toward our own predicament. Are our responses
to this situation free from rational absurdities? In lieu of mythical
conceptions, science now asserts primacy in making sense of the
world. So we appeal to scientific rather than divine expertise for
intervention. But a paradox looms in this appeal, most obviously
when experts testify about subjects beyond the fact-finder's ken.
Observe that the fact-finder is urged to use experts because he
lacks the necessary skill or knowledge, but that he is also expected
to critically evaluate their testimony, even to resolve conflicts
among them. But how can a person unsure of basic concepts of a
discipline penetrate its complexities or arbitrate disputes between
its high priests? No wonder that our judges can also be driven,
when confronted with such Herculean tasks, to rely on the experts'
demeanour, or similar, hardly compelling "outward signs" of the
truth.
Oddly enough, this reliance is not without rational support.
Theorists of "rational choice" tell us that it is sometimes more ra-
tional to be irrational than rational. Where the best decision is not
sufficiently obvious, they maintain that the proper course of action
is to leave the outcome to chance.' 5 It is then the calculations of
reason, no longer the voice of God, that induce us to accept an
accidental result. And if a coin's toss can do as a means of decision
in this situation, why not an expert's authoritative comportment on
the stand or his personal idiosyncrasy - a psychoanalyst's impres-
sive German accent, for example? To be rational is to try to bring
about the best result possible under the circumstances.
3. Logic and Reasons of the Heart
In the adversary process of classical Rome, witnesses were
strange creatures. They testified not only to the facts of the case,
but were also expected to express solidarity with the party who
called them to the stand.'6 Appeals to the decisionmaker's senti-
ment were not excluded from testimony, and the presentation of
evidence was contaminated by advocacy. Argument was classified
as a means of proof, and valued more than evidence in our sense of
15 "As in Kant's critique, the first task of reason is to recognize its own limitations and
draw the boundaries within which it can operate." JON ELS ER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS:
STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 17 (1989).
16 See, eg., GIOVANNI PUGLIESE, La Preuve dans le Proces Romain de l'Epoque Clas-
sique, in 16 RECUEILS DE LA SocrTt JEAN BODIN POUR L'HISTOIRE COMPARATIVE DES
INSTITUTIONS 281, 282, 312 (1964).
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the word.' 7 To have a persuasive person as a witness on one's team
was often a matter of decisive importance. This fusion of evidence
and argument, of logic and emotion, appears to us a lapse in ration-
ality of a legal culture that is otherwise admired for its intellectual
sophistication. The problem seems augmented by the unexplained
nature of the court's judgment. Judges were not obligated to ex-
plain their decisions, and its rectitude could not be checked by ex-
amining reasons advanced in its support. It thus remains
problematic whether the classical Roman court, exposed to the me-
lange of evidence and rhetorical argument, could properly tell
apart true from good forensic stories.
Were truth-conducive properties of Roman litigation trumped
by other values? Or were Roman witnesses a transitory form from
oath-helpers to our witnesses? I need not enter into this contro-
versy. I note Roman "global" testimony only because it under-
scores our strongly negative reaction to procedural arrangements
in which material for rational calculation is mixed and mingled
with material addressed to the sentiment. The melange of logic
and emotion appears to us detrimental to accurate fact-finding.
And yet we permit it.
Consider Anglo-American jury trials. At the proof-taking
stage, counsel take great pains to eliminate information capable of
unduly engaging the jurors' emotions, meticulously pruning evi-
dence of argument and of opinion. At the close of evidence, how-
ever, they spread the peacock feathers of their rhetoric. Having
first displayed great concern for the jurors' emotional vulnerability,
they now openly play on the chords of the jurors' emotions. And
as the jury retires to deliberate, it has been exposed, albeit serially
rather than in connectionist fashion, to a mixture of material for
logical inference and for "the logic of sentiment." Moreover, as
with Roman judgments, the jury verdict is unexplained. It thus re-
mains uncertain whether the jurors' decision has proper support in
canons of valid reasoning, or whether the jury was unduly swayed
by effective rhetoric with weak moorings in evidence.
Admittedly, we have come a long way from the days of Cicero.
Today's decisionmaking material is conceptually much more differ-
17 Argument vas termed "external" or "artificial" proof, with the adjective "artificial"
approvingly referring to the "art" of the speaker. On the multiple meanings of argumen-
turn in classical Rome, see J. PH. LEvY, La Formation de la Thdorie Romaine des Preuves,
in STUDI IN ONORE DI SIRO SOLAZZI NEL CINQUANTESIMO ANNIVERSARIO DEL SUO IN-
SEGNAMENTO UNIVERSITART0, 1899-1948, 425 (E. Jovene 1948).
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entiated, permitting focus on "the facts of the case" - these small
stubborn foot soldiers of veracity. Testimony not only stands apart
from argument, but it is also more detached from the personal sta-
tus of the witness, or from his moral character, than was the case in
classical Rome. On the other hand, however, our fact-finding ar-
rangements still remain vulnerable to criticism by sombre rational-
ists intent on securing precise analysis of evidence. They favor a
cool calculation of probabilities, a calculation that is unaffected by
"messy" processes of inner psychological acceptance. In other
words, despite prevailing conceptions on optimal truth acquisition,
we allow ample space for decisionmakers to deploy "reasons of the
heart unknown to reason."' 8
4. Epistemology and Common Sense
Evidence scholars tend to insufficiently appreciate these dis-
crepancies between prevailing epistemological theories and fact-
finding for the purpose of adjudication. Much as the capacity of
people in distant cultures is underestimated to react with practical
common sense to problems that arise in administering justice, so is
the impact on adjudication overestimated of dominant epistemo-
logical currents. This is easy to understand: underestimating the
role of the pre-theoretical is a theorist's natural failing - his defor-
mation professionelle. It is thus fitting to close these remarks on
proof and culture by demonstrating the power of common sense in
the eminently practical activity of adjudication.
The tenacity of common sense has already been illustrated by
the example of proof practices of early medieval society. We have
seen that a mythical conception of the universe then prevailed, and
with it the belief that deity could be induced to reveal the truth in
litigation. This belief, in turn, affected the proof "technology" of
the period - most directly trials by ordeal. But as we have also
seen, medieval people did not unreflectively act out their cultural
schema. Although divine relevation of the truth was part of the
epoch's "epistemology," they did not ask Divinity to produce all
forensic evidence. On the contrary, many truth-revealing devices
were employed that are still considered legitimate means of acquir-
ing knowledge, despite the wide gulf that separates our contempo-
18 Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaft point. BLAISE PASCAL, PENStES SUR
LA RELIGION ET SUR QUELQUES AUTRES SUJETS 163 (3d ed. 1960).
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rary common sense from its medieval ancestor. 19 In short,
"mythical" forms of proof Were not nearly as-important as it ap-
pears to one exploring connections between dominant conceptions
of the universe and fact-finding arrangements.
The relationship between scholastic epistemology and the so-
called "numerical proof" system that emerged in the Roman-canon
procedure of the twelfth century is also distorted. Scholastic phi-
losophers believed that knowledge springs from authoritative
sources rather than from direct observation or empirical inquiry.
This view on the sources of knowledge suggests a possible connec-
tion to Roman-canon rules of proof - the rule, for example, re-
quiring two eyewitnesses or the defendant's confession as a
prerequisite for a criminal conviction. If a confession or the testi-
mony of two eyewitnesses was obtained, it can be argued the judge
would proceed to automatically convict the defendant without
weighing the evidence. This automatism seems to reflect scholastic
attitudes toward knowledge. Knowledge is secured by fidelity to
authoritative rules, rather than by personal inquiries or by infer-
ence from data supplied by the senses.20 Admittedly, this parallel
between scholastic epistemology and the "numerical" proof system
is tempting to draw. A careful reading of primary sources reveals,
however, that the architects of Roman-canon proof never contem-
plated that judges should merely count rather than evaluate evi-
dence. Nor did an automatic application of evidence rules develop
in practice.
In designing practical arrangements for their budding inquisi-
torial procedure, the architects of Roman-canon proof, if inter-
ested in philosophy at all, were much more attracted to fragments
of Aristotelian epistemology that stressed the role of sensory per-
ception in cognition than to the abstractions of schoolmen 2' Truth
19 Remember the assessment of the litigants' demeanour in trials by ordeal, as well as
the socio-psychological pressures on them to make dispositive admissions.
20 The belief that the original Roman-canon proof system converted the judge into an
automaton who counted rather than weighted evidence is widespread among evidence
scholars. See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 6-7 (1977);
BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": His-
TORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 3 (1991). For an
example of the argument linking this automatism to scholastic philosophy, see J. D. Jack-
son, Two Methods of Proof in Criminal Procedure, 51 MOD. L. REv. 549, 550, 552 (1988).
21 A widely influential fourteenth century commentator, Baldus de Ubaldis, even ridi-
culed aspects of the potentially applicable scholastic philosophy - the insistence, for ex-
ample, on the impossibility of proving the negative. See Norbert Horn, Philosophie in der
1997]
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as revealed by the senses was extolled by these founders of Ro-
man-canon proof so much that their scheme, though colored by
scholastic discourse, exhibits a pronounced proto-empiricist fla-
vor.22 Among sources of cognition, for example, pride of place was
given to the judge's direct sensory experience; what he sensed di-
rectly needed no proof. Rules regarding witnesses were expected
to be applied flexibly, always having regard to whether the testi-
mony "moves" the fact-finder's mind. Demeanour evidence was
greatly appreciated and noted in a special dossier. "It is impossi-
ble," wrote one of the greatest Roman-canon authorities of the tre-
cento, "to devise true and certain rules on the reliability of
arguments and witnesses, because of the varying nature of men, the
multiplicity of their dealings, and the unknown veracity of wit-
nesses." 23 The only "numerical rule" that was meant to be rigid in
application was the ban on deciding factual issues on the testimony
of a single witness. By far the greatest part of the massive Roman-
canon evidence law consisted of non-binding "presumptions."
They expressed much of what passed as common sense in the pe-
riod, including its prejudices concerning gender, social class, reli-
gious affiliation, and the like.
So much for theory.
Whatever we can glean about court practice from consilia and
similar sources suggests that judges were not automatons counting
evidence. For example, it was enough for a judge to find inconsis-
tency in the testimonial account of an eyewitness to refuse to apply
the two eyewitnesses rule. Conflicting testimony was as common
an occurrence then as it is today, and in resolving the conflict the
judge greatly relied - as expected by the founders of the system
- on the demeanour of witnesses. Greater numbers of witnesses
mattered only when other things remained equal.24 Reliance on
authority in the acquisition of knowledge played a role mainly in
the sense that the elevated social station of a witness counted more
Jurisprudenz der Kommentatoren: Baldus Philosophus, in 1 Ius COMMUNE 104, 138
(Helmut Coing ed., 1967).
22 For a discussion of these foundational problems, see Mirjan Damagka, Hearsay in
Cinquecento Italy, in 1 STUDI IN ONoRE DI VrrroRlo DEwn 59, 61-66 (1994).
23 Walter Ullmann, Medieval Principles of Evidence, 62 LAW Q. REv. 77, 83 (1946)
(quoting Baldus de Ubaldis).
24 "Inter probationes adversantes," Baldus advises the judge, "sequi conscientiam
suam." 4 BALDUS DE UBALDIS, CONSILIORUM sivE RESPONSIORUM BALDI UBALDI
PERUSINm 455 n.2 (Venice, Nicolino 1590).
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in assessing the weight of his testimony than our present sensibili-
ties find appropriate or justified- 5
In summary, Roman-canon proof is seriously distorted when
depicted as a rigid "numerical" arrangement. This holds true for
the whole historical period in which scholastic views dominated the
European thought on sources of knowledge. Long before empiri-
cism and the inductive method dethroned scholasticism from its
dominant position in epistemology, "inquisitorial" judges searched
for the truth by seeking to ascertain traces that remained after an
event in human memory. And like Umberto Eco's brother Wil-
liam, they also followed traces in the external world, engaging in
"occular inspections" and drawing inferences from data supplied
by the senses. On the whole, Roman canon proof rules were no
more than minimal evidentiary requirements for the court's find-
ings-a safeguard, we might say, against judicial arbitrariness.
But let us briefly return to the present.
We live in a period of transition in which discrepancies be-
tween dominant epistemological theories and common sense prac-
tices are again manifest. In fact, a radical discord is emerging
between existing proof practices and influential epistemological
currents. I say "radical" because the discord in question concerns
the very foundation of fact-finding activity. Observe that fact-find-
ing makes no sense unless a variant of the view is embraced that
assumes some sort of a "match" between our statements about the
world and the world itself. Failing this assumption, a trap door
opens from under all Western evidentiary systems. Ordinary com-
mon sense takes this match for granted, of course, but not much of
contemporary philosophy that treats "correspondence" theories of
the truth with utter contempt.26 Some influential "post-modern"
philosophers go even so far as to posit a complete disjunction of
language from external reference - to ascribe to words the capac-
ity to represent reality - even if socially constructed, is branded as
a vulgar illusion. So, then, must be our attempts to reconstruct re-
ality in the courtroom.
25 "Ex qualitate testibus non minus quam ex numero informabit iudex animum suum in
totum." Id.
26 Even those philosophers who cling to the ideal of truth as a "match" or as "fitting-
ness", often imagine truth as a "fit" of one socially constructed version of the world with
other versions, rather than as a fit of a version to the world. See, e.g., NELSON GOODMAN,
WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 138 (1978). The covenant between word and world seems to
have been broken.
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This radical break between common sense and theoretical
thought need not last very long, however. Presently fashionable
theories could soon prove to be oversubtle fads, or even a form of
intellectual pathology, without impact on such eminently practical
activity as is fact-finding. This cannot confidently be said, however,
for another challenger to common sense-modem science. Scien-
tific methods have already penetrated into the courtroom, and
their importance for factual inquiries is growing by leaps and
bounds. But even as we salute this development as raising the "ra-
tionality quotient" of fact-finding, we must recognize tensions be-
tween proof arrangements based on common sense and those
suggested by scientism. These tensions are likely to grow as more
powerful scientific instruments became available.
Perform a small thought-experiment to begin to see what is at
issue. Imagine that your are a fact-finder. Your intuition tells you
a witness is lying, while the expert on an improved, more "objec-
tive" lie-detection method tells you the opposite. At what point do
you abandon your belief, or your common sense inferences be-
cause of conflicting scientific evidence? As presently constituted,
the administration of justice calls for information about concrete,
unrepeatable events and diverse, often incommensurable qualities.
In assessing this information, fact-finders strongly rely on common
sense and on whisperings of intuition. Science, on the other hand,
relies on quantified regularities; its messengers in the court room
need not have any knowledge about the concrete circumstances
that brought about the lawsuit. They may even pride themselves
on conveying "counter-intuitive" information. Make no mistake;
science steadily elbows common sense away from its privileged po-
sition among mechanisms with which to make sense of our life-
world.
To be sure, our ordinary processes of cognition are still well-
entrenched and in widespread use in court. The fact-finding com-
ponent in the whole of adjudication should not be over-empha-
sized. Expert opinion, moreover, is still evaluated by such old-
fashioned mechanisms as are inferences from the expert's beha-
viour on the stand. But as science continues to establish itself as
the overall arbiter in affairs of everyday life, we might gradually
begin to lose our present confidence to contradict or to critically
assess scientific insight. Science may thus end up not only complet-
ing the removal of the sacred from the world, but also by complet-
ing the removal of common sense from adjudicative fact-finding.
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How these potential developments relate to the Western rationalist
proof tradition is not altogether clear. But this is a theme for an-
other occasion.
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